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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUB PaoCEss-ENFoaCED CoLLECTION OF STATB
UsB TAX FROM NoNREsmBNT VENDOR-Appellant is a Delaware corporation
engaging in the retail furniture business in Delaware. It has no place of busi•
ness in Maryland, nor does it solicit orders in that state. It does not accept mail
or phone orders from Maryland, nor does it advertise in any Maryland publica·
tions. The only contacts which the appellant has with Maryland customers,
aside from direct dealings at appellant's retail store, are occasional direct mail
advertisements, which it sends to all of its customers wherever located, and
deliveries of goods purchased by Maryland customers. These deliveries are either
made by commercial carrier or by appellant's own truck. On one of its delivery
runs into Maryland this truck was seized by Maryland authorities and held for
satisfaction of a tax claim asserted against appellant by that state. The tax
claim was based on the Maryland use tax,1 which provides that a vendor en·
gaging in business in the state must collect the tax from its customers and remit
it to the state or be personally liable. Appellant alleged that imposition of this
tax and seizure of its truck were unconstitutional, but the Maryland Supreme
Court held it liable for the tax.2 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States held, imposition on appellant of liability for the tax was contrary to the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller Brothers Company
11. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 74 S.Ct. 535 (1954).
Two generally recognized rules concerning the power of a state to tax are
that it may tax property and persons subject to its sovereignt:y3 and that it may

1 Maryland Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 81, §368 et seq.
2Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, (Md. 1953) 95 A. (2d) 286.
s McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 429 (1819); Curry v. Mc•
Candless, 307 U.S. 357 at 366, 59 S.Ct. 900 (1939).
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not directly tax interstate commerce.4 A tax on the privilege of making a retail
sale within the state may therefore be levied,5 as may a tax properly placed on
the use of property within the state.6 Serious problems arise, however, when a
sale transaction is made partially within a state and partially without. One
problem is whether the state of the purchaser may tax the sale of goods coming
into it by way of interstate commerce.7 Another problem, relating to the impo•
sition of a use tax, arises because most use tax statutes contain provisions making
the vendor responsible for collecting the tax and remitting it to the state in
which the property sold is 'to be used. 8 The use tax is complementary to the
sales tax and is designed primarily for the purpose of protecting local merchants
from the competition of merchants doing business in states having no sales
tax. 9 In theory, the tax is placed on the purchaser and is therefore a form
of property tax. In practice, the ultimate burden is placed on the vendor,
and various penalties against him are established in order to enforce this
liability.10 If we are to look at the "incidence of the tax and its practical operation" as the Court has said we must in determining the constitutionality
of a state tax,11 it would seem that the, use tax is really a tax on the vendor
and that, in order to justify it, sovereignty of the state over the vendor and
the sale transaction must be established. Depending on the result which it
apparently sought to reach, the Supreme Court on different occasions has said
that use taxes and sales taxes are the same or dissimilar.12 Most of the distinctions made are without substance, however. In attempting to draw the
line within which the taxing jurisdiction of the purchaser's state is valid and
beyond which it is void, the Court has employed and discarded a variety of
criteria, subjecting itself to some caustic comment en route.13 In various de-

4 Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489, 7 S.Ct. 592 (1887); Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S.Ct. 325 (1939); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 58 S.Ct. 913 (1938).
5 Woodru£E v. Parham, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 123 (1868); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S.
622, 5 S.Ct. 1091 (1885); New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 27 S.Ct.
188 (1907).
6 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 57 S.Ct. 524 (1937); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 59 S.Ct. 389 (1939); Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182, 59 S.Ct. 396 (1939).
7 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 S.Ct. 388 (1940);
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 64 S.Ct. 1023 (1944).
.
8 Maryland Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 81, §371.
9 Criz, ''The Use Tax: History, Administration, and Economic Effects," 78 PuB.
ADM. SERV. 1 at 2 (1941); Henneford v. Silas Mason, note 6 supra, at 581.
10 Maryland Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 81, §375, makes the vendor personally
liable for failure to collect. Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §423.12 makes the tax a debt owed
by the retailer to the state, and calls for the revocation of a foreign corporation's permit to
do business for failure to pay.
11 International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 at 441,
64 S.Ct. 1060 (1944); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., note 7 supra,
dissenting opinion at pp. 60, 61.
12 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., note 7 supra, at 330; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co., note 7 supra, at 49.
1a 57 HARv. L. REv. 1086 (1944).
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cisions the Court has said that a state may impose a sales tax where there is
delivery within the taxing state in conjunction with substantial local activity,14
but may not where there is nothing more than solicitation and delivery,1 5
although it may impose a use tax on the vendor in the latter situation.16 It
has stated that a use tax may be imposed on strictly interstate sales if the
vendor also does a related intrastate business,17 but that an occupation tax
on the privilege of engaging in retail sales may not be assessed under the same
circumstances.18 The opinion in the principal case was a victory for Justice
Jackson, climaxing a ten year fight begun with his dissent in General Trading
Co. v. State Tax Commissioner,19 in which the Court held that a use tax may
be enforced against a vendor who merely solicits orders within the taxing
state. It brings some order into one area of this problem by limiting the
power of a state to tax an out-state vendor by calling a tax really based on
a sale transaction a use tax.
·It would seem that a true use tax applied to and collected from the consumer is, and should be, perfectly valid. To make a foreign corporation a
collecting agent for the state when it maintains a local retail store,20 or a
sales office,21 or carries on "solicitation plus"22 within the taxing state may
also be valid, but a tax on a strictly interstate sale should have some stronger
constitutional justification than the power to coerce compliance. The fact that
a state can force a vendor to pay a tax on his interstate activity by threatening
to revoke a local privilege should not be an argument in favor of the validity
of the tax itself. An attempt, as in the principal case, to place tax liability on
a foreign corporation whose only activity in the taxing state is the delivery of
goods sold by it outside the state is clearly beyond the scope of permissible state
taxing power. It is gratifying that the Court drew this line to stop an arbitrary
extension of a state's sovereignty. In the light of the realistic approach of the
principal case, an approach by which a use tax levied on the vendor is equated
with a sales tax, it will now be in order for the Court to re-evaluate some of its

14 McGolclrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., note 7 supra, at 49, " ••• transfer
of possession to the purchaser within the state, which is the taxable event regardless of the
time and place of passing title •.• ," and at 58, "Here the tax is conditioned upon a local
activity, delivery of goods within the state upon their purchase for consumption."
15 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., note 7 supra.
16 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, 322 U.S. 335, 64 S.Ct. 1028
(1944). Cf. Reichman-Crosby Co. v. Stone, 204 Miss. 122, 37 S. (2d) 22 (1948).
17Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 at 364, 61 S.Ct. 586 (1941);
Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, 61 S.Ct. 593 (1941).
18 Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 at 539, 71 S.Ct. 377
(1951).
19 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, note 16 supra.
20 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., note 17 supra.
21 Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 59 S.Ct. 376 (1939); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 54 S.Ct. 575 (1934); McGolclrick v. Felt &
Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70, 60 S.Ct. 404 (1940).
22 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945).
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earlier decisions in this field. As Justice Jackson said ten years ago, a state should
have no "power to make a tax collector of one whom it has no power to tax.''23

John Leddy, S.Ed.

23 General

Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, note 16 supra, at 339.

